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Chap te r
8
MONETARY POLICY IN SINGAPORE
AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
Chow Hwee Kwan and Peter Wilson
“I’m forever blowing bubbles, pretty bubbles in the air. They rise so high
they reach the sky and like my dreams they fade and die.” (West Ham
United supporters’ song)
SINGAPORE’S MONETARY POLICY RESPONSE
TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Prior to the crisis the consensus amongst central bankers in advanced
economies was that price stability, in the form of low and stable price
inflation, was a top priority for monetary policy and could best be
achieved by targeting interest rates (usually overnight) or monetary
aggregates, such as Narrow Money (M1) and Broad Money (M2).
Liquidity in the banking system could be flexibly adjusted on a daily
basis through open market operations to increase or decrease the
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monetary base which would be transmitted to the rest of the
economy through financial intermediation. Financial markets would
then adjust longer-term interest rates relevant to the real economy,
such as mortgage rates and 12-month corporate bond rates, and
could largely be left alone to price risk and allocate credit efficiently,
since financial markets were generally considered to be rational and
efficient.
But there is a problem if banks will not lend because lenders are
worried that loans will not be repaid or could not be sold on. The
result is a credit crunch reflected in a widening of interest rate spreads
as banks borrow cheaply from the central bank but lend to their
customers at much higher rates (or not at all) in the inter-bank mar-
ket. This clogs up the traditional monetary transmission mechanism
and eventually spills over into the real economy and produces a defla-
tionary spiral. Monetary policy thus becomes powerless as everyone
rushes into cash to fill the holes in their short-term funding and any
increase in the monetary base engendered by the central bank ends
up mostly in the reserves held by the banks themselves rather than in
the money supply. The problem is compounded by the fact that no
central bank can reduce nominal interest rates below zero.
Once the global financial crisis had clearly broken in the second
half of 200869 and it was clear that reducing nominal interest rates and
providing more liquidity through traditional channels was insufficient,
the emphasis quickly switched to avoiding a loss of confidence in the
financial markets, a catastrophic fall in spending and asset prices and a
full-blown depression of the 1930s variety. Central banks responded
by offering emergency measures in the form of more types of credit,
easier borrowing conditions and longer terms for loans. The European
Central Bank (ECB), for example, guaranteed unlimited funds for up
to six months instead of one week. Meanwhile in the autumn of 2008
the US Federal Reserve (FED) introduced targeted direct lending to
the private sector via purchases of commercial paper and its Term
140 C. H. Kwan and P. Wilson
69 See Asian Development Bank (2009) and Chapter 2 of this book for the timeline
of the crisis.
b1110_Chapter-08.qxd  2/21/2011  11:03 AM  Page 140
b1110 Challenges for the Singapore Economy
Asset Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), which purchased asset-
backed securities collateralized by student loans, credit card loans and
loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration, and the US
Government agreed to buy assets and equity from financial institu-
tions through its Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).
Moreover, with interest rates close to zero central banks had effec-
tively begun to increase the monetary base through ‘quantitative
easing’ or the monetizing of debt. In the UK the Bank of England
bought gilts and corporate debt to increase liquidity and the Bank of
Japan purchased medium and long-term government bonds and asset-
backed securities and equity and paid for them by ‘printing money’.70
In the US the FED extended its balance-sheet with new assets and lia-
bilities without sterilization. Even the European Central Bank
engaged in the practice by increasing the range of assets it was pre-
pared to accept as collateral. More unorthodox measures were
introduced where necessary and in many cases governments stepped
in to guarantee bank deposits to prevent ‘a run on the bank’ or the
switching of deposits to other countries, such as the Irish Republic,
where such guarantees were already in place. In the UK the govern-
ment took troubled bank Northern Rock into national ownership in
February 2008 following a ‘run on the bank’ in 2007 and acquired a
significant stake in other threatened banks, such as the Royal Bank of
Scotland. Rescue packages guaranteed potential losses and credit guar-
antees allowed banks to issue bonds backed by government loans.
In Asia, where the direct financial effects of the global crisis
were much less severe, governments tended to respond with more
orthodox monetary and fiscal policies (apart from Japan which had
been fighting deflation since the early 1990s and whose central
bank had been engaged in explicit quantitative easing since 2001),
including monetary easing to ensure adequate liquidity and main-
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70 Other, more creative methods, used to increase liquidity have included the Bank of
Japan’s lending of foreign exchange reserves to Japanese companies operating
abroad, such as Toyota, and letting small and medium sized enterprises borrow using
cuttlefish and sea slugs as collateral.
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tain the flow of credit and stimulatory fiscal packages to sustain
spending in the economy.
This was also the case in Singapore which, as suggested in Chapter 2,
was not significantly affected by the direct financial fallout from the sub-
prime mortgage crisis and resulting credit crunch. Although Singapore’s
banks had become more internationalized since the late 1990s and had
been active in cross-border mergers and acquisitions in the Asian region,
large foreign multinational banks are not dominant in the domestic
banking system, so it was easier for Singapore’s central bank, the
Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) to carry out its supervisory
functions and ensure a continuation of lending.71
Whilst discretionary macroeconomic policies in Singapore are
seen to be broadly countercyclical, especially during prolonged
downturns, when they can help to cushion the impact and prevent a
more severe deterioration in domestic activity than might otherwise
be the case, it has long been recognised that the power of such poli-
cies is limited by the ultra-openness of the economy. Not only is the
Republic particularly exposed to externally-driven demand shocks,
but any adjustment through a change in domestic expenditure is
weakened by a very high import leakage.
Monetary policy in Singapore since 1981 has been explicitly aimed
at providing an environment for sustained non-inflationary economic
growth and price stability over the medium-term horizon but, as we
shall see, it is also designed to be countercyclical in the shorter run,
especially when the economy is overheating and inflationary pressures
threaten, as in the second half of 2007. In addition the financial sys-
tem has, by and large, been well-regulated and a high savings policy
has provided a large and growing pool of foreign exchange reserves to
reinforce the credibility of exchange rate policy and provide the means
for the MAS to actively engage in the foreign exchange market to
142 C. H. Kwan and P. Wilson
71 According to an interview given by the Managing Director of the MAS to the
Singapore Straits Times on 10th April 2010, of the 150 foreign banks operating in
Singapore none of them suffered a “major incident” during the crisis. AIA, the local
subsidiary of the giant insurance company AIG was also largely unaffected despite
AIG itself being on the verge of collapse in September 2008.
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manage the Singapore dollar on a daily basis. On the other hand, there
seems to be a psychological limit to the willingness of the MAS to
push the Singapore dollar substantially downwards if the economy is
moving into a potentially deep recessionary phase, since this conflicts
with its overriding mission (as with other central banks) to preserve
the purchasing power of the local currency in global markets to safe-
guard the value of private savings, compulsory Central Provident
Funds (CPF) and the official foreign exchange reserves.72
Crucial, therefore, to macroeconomic adjustment in Singapore
during severe contractions, are complementary policies which can
take some of the heat out of exchange rate adjustment. Historically
this has been helped by automatic labour market adjustment through
a fall in wages, together with direct cost-cutting exercises by the gov-
ernment, including reductions in employer contributions to the CPF
and price reductions by the public utilities. In 1998, for example, a
package of cost cuts together with improvements in productivity and
wage restraint effectively cut unit business costs by an impressive 12%
in 1999 compared to the previous year (Peebles and Wilson, 2005).
In the past, there is a case for saying that the main brunt of the
burden of adjustment to recessions in Singapore has been borne by
domestic workers through wage cuts and cuts to their employers’
CPF contributions and by foreign workers on short-term contracts
who have been sent home. Interestingly, in the current crisis,
although there has undoubtedly been a significant cut in wages and
exodus of foreign workers, the impact on Singaporean workers was
significantly softened by the Skills Programme for Upgrading and
Resilience (SPUR) and the subsidies to employers provided through
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72 Moreover, even if the TWS$ were depreciated strongly, the competitive benefits
for Singapore’s exports would be small while the pass-through of higher import costs
into domestic prices and costs would be very strong and quick given Singapore’s
dependence on imports. All the evidence suggests that it is income effects not price
effects which drive Singapore’s exports so that the expenditure switching benefits of
a large devaluation are small and transitory. The protection of Singapore’s savings is
part of the implicit social contract between citizens and the government. See Chapter
11 for further details.
b1110_Chapter-08.qxd  2/21/2011  11:03 AM  Page 143
b1110 Challenges for the Singapore Economy
the January 2009 S$4.5 billion Jobs Credit Scheme which was
designed to keep Singaporeans in employment.73
One way to think about this is that during a recessionary phase in
the business cycle there is a need to reduce the real effective exchange
rate to offset the fall in external demand. This can partially be done
by a central-bank induced depreciation of the nominal trade-
weighted Singapore dollar (TWS$) but this can be reinforced by a fall
in domestic costs. For a historical look at these issues, see Peebles and
Wilson (2005).
The difficulties for monetary policy are compounded by the fact
that the Singapore government appears to be very reluctant to use
fiscal policy automatically as a countercyclical tool in the same way as
in other countries, but rather prefers to apply fiscal measures in an ad
hoc and temporary fashion during downturns. This stems partly from
the very large import leakage from a dollar of government spending,
but also from a long-term commitment to budget surpluses to sup-
port a high savings rate, an ideological aversion to universal welfare
payments and the desire to focus fiscal policy on long-run goals,
including the attraction of export-oriented mobile foreign capital and
social goals, such as increasing the citizen birth rate and reducing
traffic congestion.
In the recent economic downturn both monetary and fiscal
policies were employed in Singapore to lighten the impact of the
global crisis on the domestic economy but the main emphasis was
undoubtedly placed on the fiscal response.74 The FY2009 Budget
was brought forward to January and included a S$20.5 billion
Resilience Package (about 8% of GDP) to save jobs, enhance the
cash flow and the competitiveness of firms, support families, and
strengthen the economy’s long-term capabilities. A key feature of
the package was the S$4.5 billion Jobs Credit Scheme, which pro-
vided cash grants to employers to subsidise part of their local wage
bill. The government also extended S$5.8 billion in capital for a
144 C. H. Kwan and P. Wilson
73 The adjustment of the labour market during the crisis and the role of government
subsidized training schemes is the focus of Chapter 5.
74 See Chapter 9 for details on Singapore’s fiscal policy in relation to the crisis.
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Special Risk-Sharing Initiative (SRI) to co-share risks with the banks
and stimulate bank lending and ensure that a broader segment of
companies had access to credit to sustain their operations. In addi-
tion, to reduce the cost burden and ease the cash flow of businesses,
a number of tax measures were introduced including a 40% property
tax rebate for industrial and commercial properties and a reduction
in the corporate income tax rate. To address longer-term structural
issues the government pressed ahead with investment in infrastruc-
ture, education, healthcare and research and development. These
investments stimulate aggregate demand in the short-run but 
have the added merit that they also produce some longer-term
social return.
As far as monetary policy specifically is concerned, the priority
in Singapore, as in other countries in the region was to ease mone-
tary policy, increase liquidity and prevent a mass withdrawal of
deposits. Bank deposits were fully guaranteed until 2010 and the
MAS arranged a US$30 billion foreign exchange swap with the US
Federal Reserve (FED) to enable banks to get access to emergency
liquidity should it be needed. MAS also loosened monetary policy,
but to understand how this was actually implemented, requires
some elaboration on Singapore’s rather unique exchange rate-
centred monetary policy.75
Since 1981, Singapore’s monetary policy, summarised in the
acronym ‘BBC’ or basket, band and crawl, has been centred on the
exchange rate with the primary objective of ensuring domestic price
stability as an anchor for macroeconomic stability in general and a
sound basis for sustainable economic growth.76 The exchange rate 
is monitored and ‘managed’ against a trade-weighted basket 
of currencies (TWS$) of Singapore’s major trading partners and
Monetary Policy in Singapore and the Global Financial Crisis 145
75 For the exchange rate aspects of Singapore’s monetary policy see Chapter 10.
76 There is no doubt that, despite its unorthodoxy, monetary policy in Singapore has
been very successful since 1981 in helping the economy to adjust to periodic
economic shocks. It has delivered a stable currency and low and stable consumer price
inflation without sacrificing economic growth and employment, and has avoided
balance of payments crises. See Wilson (2002) and Peebles and Wilson (2009).
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competitors but is allowed to float within an undisclosed policy
band determined by the MAS in order to absorb short-term market
volatility. A particular policy band for the TWS$ is identified twice a
year in April and October which will ensure price stability over the
medium term and the ‘monetary policy stance’ is communicated to
the public in an official Monetary Policy Statement (MPS). This can
be fine-tuned if necessary through a ‘crawl’ mechanism to prevent
the TWS$ from becoming misaligned if conditions change in the
period before the next policy announcement. The precise width of
the policy band and the weights used to calculate the TWS$ are not
released to the public but market participants and academics can
usually make reasonable guesses about them. This allows the MAS
some room to ‘surprise’ the market on a day-to-day basis to prevent
excessive speculation against the Singapore dollar.
Singapore’s decision to forego the use of traditional monetary
policy instruments, such as interest rates and monetary aggregates, is
a consequence of its extreme openness to international trade and cap-
ital flows and its desire to ‘manage’ the currency to some degree.
Because Singapore imposes negligible protection against imports
from the rest of the world and has little by way of natural resources it
must import most of what it needs and export to pay for it. As a result
it is a classic price taker in international goods markets and the com-
bined ratio of its exports and imports to GDP — a measure of
openness to trade — is in excess of three. What the MAS has done
since 1981 has been to turn this import dependence into a virtue by
taking advantage of the powerful link between the exchange rate,
import prices, and domestic prices. Because domestic prices are
largely determined by world prices for a given exchange rate, inter-
vention to appreciate the TWS$ effectively lowers import prices and,
subsequently, wholesale and consumer prices, as the effects of the
appreciation ‘pass-through’ to the domestic economy. On the other
hand, if inflation is not a threat and there is a risk the economy will
slow down or slip into recession, the TWS$ can be depreciated to
enhance export competitiveness. Empirical studies have shown that
the exchange rate is an effective instrument of monetary policy in
Singapore and bears a stable and predictable relationship with price
146 C. H. Kwan and P. Wilson
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stability as the ultimate target of monetary policy over the medium
term. See, for example, the policy simulations carried out in
Abeysinghe and Choy (2007).
A second factor determining the choice of monetary policy in
Singapore is Singapore’s openness to international capital flows.
Foreign exchange controls and restrictions on inflows and outflows
of capital were resmoved in 1978 and Singapore has always
adopted an ‘open-arms’ approach to foreign investment.77 There is
also a very close relationship between the domestic banking system
and the substantially larger offshore Asian Dollar Market or
ADM.78 There is, in essence, almost perfect capital mobility and
substitutability between domestic (onshore) and foreign (offshore)
financial assets. The consequence of this is that interest rates in
Singapore are essentially determined by world money markets.79
Singapore is, in the financial sense, too small to set its own interest
rates in any effective way and the MAS does not seriously attempt
to manage interest rates or money aggregates. What it does do,
however, is carry out money market operations on a daily basis to
ensure that there is sufficient liquidity in the local banking system to
satisfy the banks’ demand for cash balances to meet their intra-day
settlements amongst themselves and with the central bank and to
neutralize the effects on the domestic money supply of its own
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77 Although there have been some restrictions in place since 1981 to limit the
offshore use of the Singapore dollar to prevent speculation.
78 The ADM is a market where the banks in Singapore which are licensed to deal in
the ADM can lend and borrow in a foreign (offshore) currency, usually the US
dollar. Even if the transaction is in another currency, such as the yen, it is still referred
to by convention as the Asian Dollar Market.
79 This is reinforced by the well-known ‘policy trilemma’ which suggests that central
banks will have to sacrifice traditional monetary autonomy in terms of targeting
domestic interest rates or money aggregates if they wish to ‘manage’ the currency
and keep the capital market open. Because managing the currency is thought to be
more effective in Singapore in achieving low and stable inflation than traditional
monetary instruments the MAS gives up the latter in favour of an exchange rate
centred monetary policy.
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foreign exchange operations.80 Since the money markets continued
to operate normally in Singapore there was no need for the MAS to
actually provide extra liquidity. In central banking jargon ‘no
extraordinary measures have been needed’. In any case it could not
do so since its money market operations are the endogenous result
of its need to keep the TWS$ within its targeted policy band.
Interpreted in this way, Singapore’s monetary policy response to
the global crisis was to provide any needed liquidity within the TWS$
policy band and to loosen monetary (exchange rate) policy. By the
end of 2007 MAS had progressively tightened policy in response to
increasing domestic and external inflationary pressures by increasing
the slope of the TWS$ policy band (Figure 1) and policy was further
148 C. H. Kwan and P. Wilson
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Figure 1: The Trade-Weighted Singapore dollar 2005–2010.
Source: Monetary Authority of Singapore financial database, mas.gov.sg.
80 For example, when liquidity is drained from the banking system by government
budget surpluses or a rise in net contributions to the CPF, MAS may use money mar-
ket operations, such as open market purchases of government bonds, to inject liquidity
back into the money market and keep domestic interest rates stable. Sterilization is not,
it seems, an automatic response to neutralize its own forex market operations but
depends on the balance of other factors affecting money market liquidity at the time.
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tightened in April 2008 by re-centring the policy band upwards to
the prevailing level of the TWS$.81
Then in October 2008, against the backdrop of a fragile global
economy and dissipating inflationary pressures MAS moved to a neu-
tral stance by flattening the TWS$ policy band and in April 2009
eased further by re-centring the band downwards to the prevailing
level of the TWS$ but retaining the zero percent appreciation path.
In October 2009, with the TWS$ fluctuating in the upper part of the
policy band due to weakness in the US dollar and a surge in capital
inflows into the region, the zero percent appreciation was maintained
but with no change to the width of the policy band or the level at
which it was centred. This was a response to the rebound in the econ-
omy in the second and third quarters of 2009.
Finally, in April 2010, and in concert with other central banks in
the region, MAS began once again to tighten its monetary policy
stance by re-centring the exchange rate policy band to the prevailing
level of the TWS$ and shifting the policy band from a neutral zero
percent appreciation back to one of ‘a modest and gradual apprecia-
tion’. This is predicated on the view that the domestic economy has
now rebounded from the downturn and is expected to continue on a
firm recovery path. The official growth forecast for 2010 was revised
upwards to between 7% and 9% in April 2010 and further in July to a
sizzling 13–15%. At the same time, inflationary pressures resulting
from rises in global commodity prices as well as some domestically-
driven cost pressures are expected to increase in the months ahead as
the labour market tightens and liquidity remains high given low
global interest rates and a continuing inflow of foreign capital.
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81 There was some debate about whether MAS should have tightened further in
October 2007 given the sharp rise in inflationary pressures. MAS’ own counterfac-
tual simulations suggest, however, that had there been further tightening this would
have injected greater volatility into the economy and exacerbated the fall-off in prices
when the global economy slowed in the second half of the year, taking into account
the long time lags typically associated with the exchange rate pass-through process.
Thus, the subsequent decline in economic activity would have necessitated a sharper
reversal of policy in October 2008.
b1110_Chapter-08.qxd  2/21/2011  11:03 AM  Page 149
b1110 Challenges for the Singapore Economy
Consumer price inflation is now forecast to come in at around 2.5%
to 3.5% this year compared to 0.6% last year.
Figure 2 plots the 3-month Singapore interbank offer rate
(SIBOR), which captures global interest rates measured in US dollars,
and the 3-month Domestic Interbank Offer Rate (DIBOR) denomi-
nated in S$. Figure 3 plots the Domestic Liquidity Indicator (DLI),
which is a measure of overall liquidity conditions in Singapore com-
bining changes in the TWS$ and DIBOR. A rise in the index signals
a monetary tightening compared to the previous quarter.82 Liquidity
tended to become tighter by the third quarter of 2007 as inflation-
ary pressures increased but interest rates subsequently fell sharply as
global rates were pushed down by central banks in response to the
credit crisis and monetary conditions in Singapore were broadly
accommodative (downward trend in the cumulative DLI) from
about August 2008 as the crisis unfolded. Only in mid-2009 did the
DLI begin to stabilize.
150 C. H. Kwan and P. Wilson
82 Note that when interest rates are fairly constant, as in 2009 and 2010, the DLI is
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3-Month Singapore Dollar DIBOR
Figure 2: Interest rates in Singapore 2005–2010.
Source: Monetary Authority of Singapore financial database, mas.gov.sg.
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Figures 4 and 5 graph the level of domestic credit to the private
sector and its growth over time. Credit growth reached a peak in May
2008 and declined thereafter. Despite the fact that the cost of bor-
rowing was falling to low levels, making it cheaper to borrow, the
demand for domestic credit in Singapore tends to be more responsive
to the overall level of activity in the economy.83 The financial impact
of the crisis on Singapore was thus cushioned by the fact that the fall
in domestic non-bank loan growth, which occurred alongside the
contraction in overall GDP, was less severe than during the Asian
financial crisis of 1997 and the 2001 downturn, due to strong
demand for credit in the building and construction industry and from
the residential housing sector.84 As Figure 5 shows, total and business
loan growth from the previous year did fall between Q4 2008 and Q3
2009 but consumer loan growth was quite resilient.
Monetary Policy in Singapore and the Global Financial Crisis 151









DLI Change from 3 Months Ago
Cumulative DLI
Figure 3: The Singapore domestic liquidity indicator 2007–2010.
Source: Monetary Authority of Singapore financial database, mas.gov.sg.
83 See Monetary Authority of Singapore (2009).
84 Based on Monetary Authority of Singapore (2009) estimates, the peak-to-trough
decline in domestic banking units’ non-bank loans was 0.8% between the third quar-
ter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 compared to a 4.0% fall during the previous
two recessions.
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Figure 4: Singapore’s bank lending to non-bank customers, S$ million,
2007–2010.
Source: Monetary Authority of Singapore database, mas.gov.sg.













Figure 5: Growth in bank lending to non-bank customers in Singapore
2007–2010.
Source: Monetary Authority of Singapore financial database, www.mas.gov.sg.
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As far as money aggregates are concerned (Figure 6), the broad
measure of the money supply (M2), which is determined by both
changes in the monetary base (reserve money) and the intermedia-
tion of reserve money by the banks through the money multiplier
process, fell sharply following the contraction in output in 2008 but
stabilized in 2009 as the economy recovered.85 During the crisis the
demand by banks for reserve balances rose as a result of growing lia-
bilities with a spike in September 2008 following the collapse of
Lehman Brothers and uncertainty over counterparty credit and illiq-
uidity in international funding markets. At the same time the banks
kept higher cash balances as a precautionary measure. Public sector
transactions, however, which also affect money market liquidity, were,
on balance contractionary, especially at the start of the fiscal year.
Monetary Policy in Singapore and the Global Financial Crisis 153
85 Broad money in Singapore comprises demand deposits and currency in circulation,
together with ‘quasi-money’ such as fixed savings deposits held in banks plus nego-
tiable certificates of deposit issued by Singapore banks in Singapore dollars. Reserve
money is notes and coins held by the public plus banks’ vault cash and current
accounts with the MAS.










Change in Reserve Money




The  M2 Money Multiplier
Figure 6: Monetary aggregates 2007–2009.
Source: Monetary Authority of Singapore financial database, mas.gov.sg.
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The behaviour of reserve money and broad money is also compli-
cated by net capital inflows from abroad, which increase the
monetary base and tend to appreciate the currency, and the actions of
the MAS to sterilize the liquidity effects of its own foreign exchange
operations on the money market. In 2009, for example, capital
inflows picked up significantly and if MAS intervenes in the forex
market to dampen excessive volatility by selling the Singapore dollar
in exchange for US dollars, this will also increase the monetary base
and may require offsetting sterilization through money market opera-
tions. This explains why a capital inflow need not automatically lead
to a corresponding rise in the monetary base and M2 in Figure 6.
Taking all these factors into consideration, the increase in reserve
money (Figure 6) was modest.
In sum, the MAS responded to the crisis by loosening the
monetary policy stance by flattening the exchange rate policy band
and then re-centring it downwards. From the middle of 2008 over-
all domestic liquidity, as measured by the DLI, trended downwards
as interest rates in Singapore fell in line with a fall in global rates to
low levels as economic activity slackened and central banks eased
monetary policy. At the same time, broad money in Singapore fell
as bank intermediation of reserve money contracted and banks
increased their demand for reserve and settlements balances and
the fall in GDP reduced the number of transactions. To counter
overall contractionary forces operating in the local money market
net of its own foreign exchange operations, MAS carried out
money market operations to ensure sufficient liquidity in the
banking system.
However, monetary policy in Singapore does not work alone.
Indeed fiscal policy has played a larger countercyclical role during this
crisis than in the past and was probably quantitatively more important
than monetary policy. In fiscal year 2009, the government recorded a
primary deficit86 of about S$4 billion following surpluses of S$3 billion
154 C. H. Kwan and P. Wilson
86 This is defined as operating revenue excluding net investment income or returns
less the sum of operating and development spending. The investment income or
returns are excluded on the grounds that they are volatile.
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and S$7 billion in the previous two years. Revenue fell because of a fall
in tax receipts while both operating and development expenditure
increased. Using the ‘Fiscal Impulse’ (FI) measure to better capture the
overall stance of fiscal policy87, it clearly switched from being contrac-
tionary in 2007 to expansionary mode in 2008 and 2009 (Monetary
authority of Singapore, 2010). Moreover, simulations by the Monetary
Authority of Singapore (2009) suggest that the measures introduced in
the January 2009 budget would add approximately 1.5 percentage
points to GDP growth in 2009 and reduce headline inflation by
0.2 percentage points. Monetary policy, by comparison, would have
had a smaller impact on GDP growth, although it may have helped to
alleviate some of the burden on exporters’ revenue streams at a time
when they were being hit by falling sales orders.
Overall, therefore, both monetary and fiscal policy switched
from being contractionary in 2007 when the economy was operat-
ing above potential to expansionary in 2008 and into 2009 when
GDP started to fall below potential as the global crisis began to
impact the Republic. Although one can always argue that the mag-
nitude of the fiscal and monetary stimuli could have been larger,
the fact remains that the economy has recovered much more
quickly than expected and the depth of the recession was much less
severe than anticipated.
WHITHER MONETARY POLICY AFTER
THE CRISIS?
What are the implications of the global financial crisis for the conduct
of monetary policy in Singapore?
Clearly Singapore already had in place a number of safeguards to
help insulate the domestic financial system from the crisis as it
unfolded in the second half of 2008. The ability to access funds from
other central banks, such as the FED, if necessary through swap
arrangements was one of them. Also helpful was the ‘domestic’
Monetary Policy in Singapore and the Global Financial Crisis 155
87 The FI measure takes into account the effects of the cyclical performance of the
economy on the budget.
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nature of the banking system in Singapore in which local ownership
over key financial institutions is predominant, despite the openness of
the Singapore economy to trade and capital flows; and the ability of
the MAS to provide funds and effect any necessary restructuring
through ‘moral suasion’ rather than large bailouts or nationalization.
Although Singapore had introduced substantial financial reforms in
the late 1990s, including the gradual opening up of the local banking
system to international participation, a change in emphasis from reg-
ulation to supervision in line with the prevailing view that financial
markets were generally efficient, and an incremental switch from a
rules-based to a risk-management approach, all of which might have
increased the risk of contagion from the crisis, in fact Singapore’s
banks were not heavily exposed to toxic assets and by all accounts had
sound financial fundamentals (see Chapter 2).
Nonetheless, some lessons have been learned. For example, the
need to tighten supervision over off-balance-sheet activities in the
‘shadow’ banking system and the marketing and selling of structured
investment products. In February 2010 MAS announced new safe-
guards, including a cooling-off period for structured products 
and published the findings of an investigation into the sale of
structured notes linked to Lehman Brothers.88 They found some non-
compliance with MAS Notices and Guidelines and banned some
financial institutions from selling them for periods between six months
and two years. MAS also issued a consultation paper to review the 2006
Deposit Insurance Scheme and replace the full guarantee for individual
bank deposits introduced during the crisis. The original insurance cov-
erage of S$20,000, funded by banks and insurance companies licensed
to accept deposits, will be increased to S$50,000 and the scope of the
coverage of the scheme extended to non-bank depositors.
MAS is also responding to regulatory changes arising from the 
G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Financial Stability
Board and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and International
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Accounting Standards Board, which are due to be implemented by the
end of 2012. Singapore has formed the Corporate Governance
Council to update its standards on compensation and corporate gover-
nance for companies listed in the Republic. More regulatory changes
are expected.
From a monetary policy perspective, the failure of the traditional
reliance on interest rates and money aggregates operating through the
financial intermediation of banks was of less relevance to Singapore
given its exchange-rate centred monetary policy, but it does emphasise
again the limitations of this policy in dealing with a severe downturn
in the absence of a strong fiscal stimulus and, if necessary, other
unorthodox cost-cutting measures. It also raises an interesting ques-
tion: if necessary would MAS resort to extensive quantitative easing
along the lines of the US and UK if the domestic financial system were
on the brink of collapse?
Surprisingly, there are no obvious institutional or psychological
constraints to this happening. The MAS is not an independent central
bank and there is no historical evidence to suggest that it would be
unwilling to cooperate with the Finance Ministry to provide targeted
direct lending to the private sector if necessary. Neither is there any
reason to believe that it would rule out the ‘nuclear option’ of ‘print-
ing money’. Singapore does not run a currency board system in the
same manner as Hong Kong but it does have a Currency Board
located within the MAS which, under the Currency Act, must main-
tain sufficient foreign assets in its Currency Fund to provide 100%
backing for any currency notes it issues to the banks.89
However, since the Currency Board holds foreign currency
reserves well in excess of the amount of currency in circulation, this
should not be a binding constraint. Anyway the law could always be
changed. Of course, quantitative easing would not be its first choice,
given the inflationary risks, but it need not be ruled out. The more
subtle problem would be whether the subsequent increase in liquidity
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would depreciate the Singapore dollar to an unacceptable level in
terms of its purchasing power in international markets. On the other
hand, one of the lessons from the credit crunch is that there may be
worse things than inflation, and financial stability, as opposed to price
stability, may need to be incorporated more explicitly into the policy
objectives of central banks.
Allied to this is the controversial issue whether a central bank
should tighten monetary policy preemptively in order to moderate
asset price bubbles before a sudden bust triggers financial instability,
such as a large rise in non-performing loans?90
An asset price bubble is generally characterized as a persistent
increase in an asset price that is not fully justified by fundamentals but
is caused by speculative activity and occurs mostly in periods of easy
credit and high leverage. The buildup in the asset price misalignment
implodes at some point, often unexpectedly, with a sharp correction.
An extreme case of this is what Noriel Roubini (2005, 2009) has
described a ‘monster bubble’ when cheap credit leads to speculative
leveraging in a wide range of risk assets, including commodities.
When central banks eventually tighten monetary policy, the unwind-
ing leads to a crash.
On the other hand, if the burst in economic activity is more akin
to Mishkin’s (2008) ‘echo bubble’, the situation may be far less seri-
ous since it is merely a reaction to a crash caused by loose monetary
policy and ‘irrational exuberance’, such as the 1987 stock market col-
lapse. Since there is no cycle of leveraging against higher and higher
asset values, the bubble will eventually peter out and central banks are
justified in keeping interest rates low.
Figure 7 depicts the Singapore residential property price index and
the share price index from the first quarter of 1985 to the last quarter of
2009. The Singapore housing market experienced several boom-bust
cycles during this period, with an average quarter-on-quarter growth of
1.5%. Sharp appreciations in house prices occurred in periods of rapid
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economic growth and were mostly associated with the liberalization of
the housing finance sector and, in particular, CPF regulations.
Conversely, downturns in house prices coincided with economic reces-
sions or the implementation of anti-speculation measures such as direct
credit controls. The quarter-on-quarter house price inflation rates range
from −14.1% to 15.8%, partly reflecting the rise and fall of foreign
investor interest in the Singapore property market.
Compared to house prices, stock prices in Singapore have a
higher average quarter on-quarter growth rate of 2.3%. As expected,
swings in stock price cycles are more pronounced with the growth
rates spanning a wider range of −43.1% to 42.8%. The cyclical behav-
ior in stock prices is related to business cycles as well as the ebb and
flow of foreign portfolio investment in the local stock market.
Should central banks react to bubbles using the instruments of
monetary policy?
One lesson from the present global financial crisis is that policy-
makers should not practice benign neglect in the face of asset price
bubbles. If the bubbles are big enough the result could be inflation
and then a fall in economic activity below desired levels which mone-
tary policy may not easily be able to rectify after the fact. Moreover,
not leaning against asset prices could be more harmful to the economy
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Figure 7: Singapore residential property and stock price indices.
Source: CEIC Database and International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics.
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because mopping up after the event can be very costly and may give
rise to ‘moral hazard’ and further bubbles if investors believe that the
central bank is providing insurance against downside risks. This may
then encourage them to take on excessive risks during the upswing,
thereby exacerbating the bubble. On the other hand, tightening mon-
etary policy during an upturn would reduce the financial institutions’
exposure to bad debts and lessen the severity of subsequent real and
financial disruptions. Furthermore, credible statements by the central
bank that it is concerned and would be willing to act could move pri-
vate sector behavior in a more stabilizing direction (White, 2009).
While this is unlikely to get rid of the bubble entirely, its size would
arguably be smaller and the damaging effects less pronounced.
Secondly, asset inflation may threaten general price stability by
over-stimulating consumption and investment spending or raising
inflationary expectations. For example, swings in house prices can
have potent effects on the economy via their impact on household
wealth, as the recent collapse in the US housing market has shown,
while a stock price boom could be costly to the extent that it encour-
ages excessive business investment in sub-optimal projects. Moreover,
if proactive monetary tightening is viewed as an insurance against the
risk of economic damage brought on by an eventual crash, then the
uncertainty of the boom would still justify preemptive action, just as a
homeowner needs to take some fire insurance even though he is
uncertain that his house will burn down (Borio and White, 2003).
The case for pro-active policy of some kind is also strengthened if
bubbles are seen not as one-off events but rather as a permanent
feature of the economic environment. As Singapore’s Finance
Minister, Tharman Shanmugaratnam puts it:
“Bubbles occur frequently-more so than can be explained if the ‘efficient-
market hypothesis’ holds. They are prolonged, and can cause considerable
economic damage when they burst. Bubbles and the miss-pricing of risk are
not exceptional events, but part of the regular functioning of the financial
markets.”91
160 C. H. Kwan and P. Wilson
91 See Shanmugaratnam (2009a).
b1110_Chapter-08.qxd  2/21/2011  11:03 AM  Page 160
b1110 Challenges for the Singapore Economy
There is, however, a widespread view prevalent among central
bankers themselves, that monetary policy specifically should not
react to anticipated bubbles. A key argument is that bubbles are, by
definition, extremely difficult to identity and there is a lack of pre-
cise criteria for determining if the change in asset prices is consistent
with the change in economic fundamentals.92 How then should the
central bank react to a bubble when there is uncertainty about its
size and indeed whether it even exists at all? Is it a ‘monster’ bubble
in the making or merely an ‘echo’ bubble?
A good example of this was at the beginning of 2010 when there
were different views as to whether there were bubbles building up in
the Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong property markets or whether it
was the result of genuine demand. In China’s case this was com-
pounded by the fact that there was little evidence of bubbles
elsewhere in the economy.93
This argument is strengthened if there were to be collateral
damage from preemptive tightening on other parts of the economy.
In other words, there is no ‘safe popping’ of asset price bubbles
since monetary policy is a blunt instrument. Given expectations of
further increases in asset prices, the tightening required to quash
any market euphoria may have to be severe and hence, might throw
the economy into recession. According to this point of view policy
makers should be ‘clean’ rather than ‘lean’, that is, the central bank
should wait for the bubble to collapse and then adopt traditional
monetary easing to deal with the aftermath instead of preemptive
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92 See the opposing views about China’s property bubble in the Singapore Business
Times of June 17, 2010.
93 Since then (May 2010) clearer evidence has emerged that property bubbles are
indeed building up in both China and Hong Kong and the authorities have
responded accordingly. In Beijing families are now limited to buying one new apart-
ment and cannot receive a loan if they have not paid their taxes or social security
contributions and the government is reclaiming land hoarded by developers. In
Hong Kong stamp duty has been increased for luxury flats, corporate purchases are
now restricted to 10% of total sales and the supply of land has been increased. In
August 2010, the rules were tightened further.
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tightening during an upswing. After all, accommodative monetary
policy after the bust would not only help the financial sector to cope
with balance sheet vulnerabilities but will also soften the blow on
aggregate demand.
A second argument against using monetary policy to counter
potential bubbles is that the central bank already has too many objec-
tives to be achieved with a limited range of policy instruments.
Indeed, perhaps monetary policy should serve exclusively as a
counter-cyclical tool and asset price fluctuations that do not affect
inflation within the central bank’s forecast horizon, that is one to two
years, should be ignored (Bernanke and Gertler, 2001).
This fits in with those who feel that central banks, especially in
emerging economies, already have a difficult job trying to achieve a
range of goals simultaneously. For example, by late 2009 foreign
funds had begun to flow rapidly into emerging Asia and in a world of
mobile short-term capital flows and volatile exchange rate move-
ments threatened to create bubbles in stock and property markets as
investors anticipated higher returns than in developed countries
where interest rates were historically low. The dilemma is that if Asian
central banks respond by forcing up interest rates through tighter
monetary policy this would have the perverse effect of attracting even
more foreign capital. Moreover, if their currencies are appreciating
because of a fall in the US dollar, this puts pressure on their central
banks to intervene in the foreign exchange market to offset a poten-
tial loss of export competitiveness by selling their own currencies. But
this has the effect of further increasing domestic liquidity. There are
no easy fixes and adding asset price bubbles into the equation can
only make life more difficult for central banks.
Linked to this is the view that using monetary policy to lean
against asset prices will complicate central bank communication to
the public. In particular, the use of the word “bubble” could lead to
misinterpretation and cause asset prices to react in unpredictable
ways. For example, tightening of monetary policy by the Bank of
China in January 2010 led to a sharp fall in stock prices in Shanghai.
Moreover, monetary policy is not the only policy that can mitigate
asset price bubbles. Fiscal and macro-prudential policies might offer
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better alternatives and monetary policy may not be the most effective
or the most precise instrument. For instance, if the surges in asset val-
uations are confined to particular sectors (or cities) or are the result of
productivity improvements, directed prudential policies, such as vary-
ing the ceiling in loan-to-value ratios, may be more appropriate.
This seems to be the view of the MAS according to its Managing
Director Heng Swee Kiat:
“In our case because we are also a regulator, we don’t think we should use
monetary policy in a blunt way. Monetary policy should respond to the real
economic conditions going forward. And so we need to keep a very clear
focus on using monetary policy to anchor inflation expectations and make
sure we don’t use it for more than we can deliver.”94
As well as the Ministry of Finance:
“The government will respond to the property bubble “in a calibrated fash-
ion to prevent boom and bust in the property market. It won’t involve
macro levers such as interest rates since they apply across the board to busi-
nesses at large not just to asset markets so and risk engendering a slump. So
Use credit rules, land supply decisions and, in the extreme, tax policies. It is
also difficult to monitor 4–5 years ahead.”95
In the third quarter of 2009, a 16% surge in property prices in
Singapore persuaded the government to release more land for devel-
opment and disallow borrowers from deferring property payments. In
February 2010 further measures were introduced to cool the property
market, following a spike in the sales and prices of private new homes
in the form of an additional 3% stamp duty if a property is sold within
one year of purchase and lending institutions (apart from the Housing
Board) were now only allowed to lend up to 80% of the purchase price
instead of 90%. By working directly on lending margins and counter-
ing speculative purchasing directly there was seen to be no need for
aggressive monetary policy, particularly at a time when the economic
outlook was still uncertain, as was the case in early 2010.
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Nonetheless, whether monetary policy should be used as a tool
for limiting upswings in asset prices in Singapore still depends
empirically on the effectiveness of such policy in offsetting asset
price movements and, if the answer is yes, what the costs would be if
the bubble is deflated at the expense of slower economic growth
and higher unemployment. Moreover, since it is the mission of
MAS to promote sustained non-inflationary economic growth, it is
also important to understand the effects of asset price inflation on
consumer price inflation over the medium to long term.
In order to answer these questions empirically Chow and Choy
(2009) examined Singapore’s monetary system with particular refer-
ence to local stock price and house price cycles.96 GDP and the
consumer price index are used to represent domestic economic activ-
ity and price movements, while the Singapore residential property
price index and the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES) price index
are used to proxy asset prices in the economy. For the reasons given
earlier, the TWS$ exchange rate is also included because Singapore is
a very small and open economy but, more importantly, because
changes in the TWS$ are a key indicator of the monetary policy
stance in Singapore. Interest rates and monetary aggregates, on the
other hand, are not included since the MAS does not explicitly target
these variables when it carries out monetary policy.
The time paths of the variables in the model following a one time
shock to monetary policy are then traced out and provide an indicator
of the extent to which monetary policy might influence asset prices. At
the same time, the responses of inflation and output growth serve as
an indication of both the benefits and costs of monetary policy.
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the central bank for a better identification of monetary policy innovations. The mon-
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panel dataset spanning 127 local and foreign economic time series from the first
quarter of 1980 to the second quarter of 2008.
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The results suggest that the growth rates of asset prices in
Singapore fall by a much greater extent than the growth rates of out-
put and inflation when there is a contractionary monetary policy
shock. This implies that monetary policy might indeed be effective in
leaning against upswings in property and stock prices in Singapore.
Furthermore, housing asset inflation contributes about 18% to
changes in consumer price inflation after 4 years so monetary policy
could lean against the build-up of asset price misalignments even if
near-term inflation pressures remain relatively subdued.
These results are, of course, preliminary and more work will need
to be done to see if there are links in the data through which mone-
tary policy could influence asset prices. The dynamics here are also
very difficult to model since monetary policy actions are unlikely to
have only temporary effects so a strong monetary policy reaction to a
potential asset price bubble may risk having significant collateral dam-
age to GDP growth in the longer period. Also the model does not
explicitly take into account the Uncovered Interest Parity or UIP
relationship which seems to hold for Singapore empirically and sug-
gests that a strengthening currency to offset a bubble would lead to
stronger capital inflows and a further stimulus to asset prices through
downward pressure on domestic interest rates. Given the constraints
under which the MAS operates, including extreme vulnerability to
external shocks and the use of only one effective instrument (the
TWS$) to deal with multiple objectives, it is difficult to envisage that
it would also want to use monetary policy to address bubbles any
time soon. Nonetheless the global financial crisis has made it more
likely that central banks, such as the MAS, will have to monitor bub-
bles more closely than they have done in the past, make policy
statements about them beyond Alan Greenspan’s famous ‘irrational
exuberance’, and communicate their views to the public.
It may be difficult to identify a bubble but this does not preclude
central banks from extracting information provided by asset price devel-
opments on the outlook for output and inflation in the medium term
and responding to rising asset prices, albeit in a more muted fashion, if
they judge that sufficient is known to suggest that prices are moving
well beyond what the fundamentals might suggest. For example, given
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the likely correlation between credit cycles and asset price cycles, moni-
toring variables, such as ‘credit’ growth, which may have some causal
impact on asset price bubbles can provide a practical way of dealing with
the situation and would make communication to the public simpler. On
the other hand, monetary policy that acts too narrowly in terms of pay-
ing insufficient attention to signs of financial vulnerability may itself
encourage the run up in asset prices. In other words, financial stability is
ultimately to some degree endogenous to monetary policy.
There is also need for monetary policy to work in tandem with
financial policies on macro-prudential regulation and supervision even
though the linkages between asset prices, financial instability and
monetary policy are complex, if only to reduce the pro-cyclicality of
credit cycles in order to combat instabilities caused by asset price bub-
bles. If the circumstances that call for preemptive monetary
restrictions can also be inferred from weaknesses in private sector
balance sheets and prevailing market expectations, as well as from
movements in macroeconomic variables, such as output growth and
headline inflation it follows that there should be coordination between
the monetary and prudential authorities. In this way an analysis of
monetary conditions and financial flows can provide important com-
plements to the usual macroeconomic models used by central banks.
Since supervisory and macro-prudential policies are also the responsi-
bility of MAS, this should be an easier task than in other countries
where they have either been divested on the assumption that financial
markets are generally efficient, or are located in separate and often
competing institutions, as in the UK before the crisis.
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